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Abstract
This paper aims to identify media discourse of “The Islamic 
Resistance”, the military arm of Lebanese Hezbollah. On contrary 
to many researches, this paper is significant, because it distinguishes 
between media discourse of “The Islamic Resistance” and media 
discourse of Hezbollah. With the existence of many military media 
units linked directly to military wings of organisations in the 
Middle East, this paper provides an example on how to identify 
media discourse of a military arm. 
Keywords: Hezbollah; The Islamic resistance; media discourse; 
military wings; military media units
MENGENALPASTI DAN MEMAHAMI WACANA 
MEDIA HEZBOLLAH
Abstrak
Kajian ini bertujuan untuk mengenalpasti wacana media “The 
Islamic Resistance”, sayap tentera Lebanese Hezbollah. Berbeza 
dengan penyelidik lain, kajian ini signifikan kerana ia membedakan 
wacana media antara “The Islamic Resistance” dan Hezbollah. 
Dengan wujudnya banyak unit militari media yang mempunyai 
hubungan terus dengan sayap organisasi militari di Timur Tengah, 
kertas kerja ini menyediakan satu contoh untuk mengenalpasti 
wacana media sayap militari.
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INTRODUCTION
Many militant organisations in the Middle East, including Hezbollah (written 
also Hizbullah and Hizballah), which has a military wing, have utilised the 
communication developments to establish, or to promote, their own media 
outlets. 
The main argument in this paper is that “The Islamic Resistance” is linked 
only to the leadership apparatus of Hezbollah and it is separated from all 
other Hezbollah’s bodies. As the result of Hezbollah’s organisational structure 
(Hamzeh, 2004), “The Islamic Resistance” has its own “Military Media Unit” 
to broadcast its messages and military operations’ videos, mainly via Al-Manar 
television and its satellite (Harb, 2011).
DATA COLLECTION AND METHODOLOGY
The used data in this paper are archival and what has been written in the official 
website of “The Islamic Resistance” (www.moqawama.org). Some of the data 
was originally in Arabic. However, the paper will refer to the Arabic references 
in the bibliography.
This paper is based on critical discourse analysis discipline, particularly 
Wodak (2001). Thus, this paper utilises a historical approach to identify media 
discourse of “The Islamic Resistance.” By identifying the discourse, it would be 
simple for any researcher to ensue and interpret media discourse to uncover its 
implications. 
HISTORY OF HEZBOLLAH
Many researchers and academics investigated the emergence of Hezbollah, its 
structure, its military arm, its policy, its ideology and its media outlets, especially 
Al-Manar television. Thus, shedding light on the establishment of Hezbollah 
in this research helps to identify “The Islamic Resistance” of Hezbollah and its 
media discourse. 
Understanding the emergence of Hezbollah stipulates reading the 
contemporary history of Lebanese Shiites (Alagha, 2006; Jaber, 1997; Saad- 
Ghorayeb, 2002). However, some researchers delved in the Islamic history to 
know how the Muslim Shiites emerged in the seventh century to understand 
their religious identity in order to contextualise the emergence of Hezbollah 
(Kramer, 1994). Nevertheless, this quick snapshot about Shiites’ identity serves 
only in understanding the ideology and policy of Hezbollah, as many researchers 
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did (e.g. El Houri, 2012; Harik, 2004; Saad- Ghorayeb, 2002), rather than the 
emergence of Shiites, because this course requires an independent research in 
itself within the field of Islamic history. 
Historically, the Lebanese Shiites suffered from social humiliation, economic 
deprivation and political dismissal (Alagha, 2006; Jaber, 1997; Saad- Ghorayeb, 
2002). Furthermore, they cannot organise their religious ceremonies, such as 
Ashura, the commemoration of killing Imam Hussein, the grandson of the 
Prophet Muhammad, until 1926 when the then authorities represented by the 
French mandate recognised in the newly written constitution the religious rights 
of Shiites alongside with other Lebanese sects (Alagha, 2006; Jaber, 1997).
Apart from procuring their religious rights, the undue suffer of Lebanese Shiites 
has never changed or improved to make them feel that they are really Lebanese 
citizens (Alagha, 2006). Shortly after the independence of Lebanon in 1943 and 
the withdrawal of French troops by the end of 1946, the Palestinian crisis Al-
Nakba (great misfortune) after the declaration of Israel in 1948 and the Israeli 
occupation of seven villages in south Lebanon spurred the political awareness 
of Lebanese Shiites who stood with the Palestinian cause (Alagha, 2006; Saad- 
Ghorayeb, 2002). As a result of this attitude, they supported the Egyptian leader 
Jamal Abdul-Nasser and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) to 
liberate the occupied land from Israel (Saad- Ghorayeb, 2002). However, the 
Arab defeat in 1967 war which called Al-Naksa (small misfortune) turned many 
Lebanese Shiites to join the leftist parties to face Israel (Saad- Ghorayeb, 2002).
In that era and by the end of 1950s, Lebanese Shiites invited the Iranian cleric 
Imam Musa Al-Sadr to settle in Lebanon. Al-Sadr, who became a Lebanese 
citizen in 1963, followed up the policy of openness towards other Lebanese 
sects and worked to improve the life of Shiites through organising their religious 
matters by establishing “The Lebanese Shiite Islamic Higher Council” in 
1967 and demanding the government to establish “The Council of the South” 
to develop the humiliated towns in south Lebanon. In 1974, Al-Sadr formed 
“The Movement of the Deprived” followed after one year by “The Brigades 
of the Lebanese Resistance” which called by its acronym “Amal” or “Amal 
Movement” (Alagh, 2006; Blanford, 2011; Jaber, 1997). Unlike “The Movement 
of the Deprived” which was not a Shiite framework, Amal since its inception 
was a Shiite organisation enticed Shiites in the leftist parties and its military 
wing trained initially by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. Thus, Amal 
and PLO faced together the first Israeli invasion in south Lebanon in 1978 which 
called “Litani Operation” and aimed to create a security zone south Litani River 
to prevent the Palestinian guerrillas from launching rockets against Israel (Saad-
Ghorayeb, 2002). Notably, the Palestinian operations against Israel through 
Lebanese border was approved by the Lebanese government through what so 
called Cairo Agreement in 1969 between the Lebanese Army and the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation brokered by the Arab League (Alagha, 2006; Blanford, 
2011).
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By the end of 1960s and during the 1970s, the Islamic ideology, or what so 
called or described “The Islamic Milieu”, started to crystalize in Lebanon within 
the Shiite community when the Baath’s takeover of power in Iraq in 1968 obliged 
dozens of Lebanese graduates, or by other words the new clerics, to flee back to 
their homeland (Alagha, 2006). In the same era, many families of disfranchised 
Lebanese Shiites in south Lebanon and Bekaa districts moved to eastern and 
southern suburbs of Beirut, particularly the southern suburb which turned later 
into Hezbollah’s enclave, in order to improve their lives (Alagha, 2006; Hamzeh, 
2004). These families taught by the Shiite clerics in Beirut their religious duties 
and political matters (Alagha, 2006). 
Following their opposite migration from Iraq, the clerics “including several 
potential Hizbu’llah officials, set about recreating the Iraqi-based Da’wa Party 
in Lebanon, while others established the Lebanese Muslim student’s Union 
[translated also into the Lebanese Union of Muslim Students] in the early 1970s” 
(Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002, p. 13). Notably, the late Sayyed Mohammad Hussein 
Fadlullah served “The Islamic Milieu” in Lebanon through his Islamic lectures 
enticing numbers of Amal’s members after Imam Musa Al-Sadr’s disappearance 
in 1978 (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). Shortly prior to the Islamic Revolution in Iran 
in 1979, members of “The Islamic Milieu” in Lebanon established with former 
members of Amal Movement what so called “The Committee Supportive of the 
Islamic Revolution” which considered Hezbollah’s prospective nucleus (Alagha, 
2006; Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002).
The Israeli invasion to Lebanon and the occupation of Beirut in 1982 to 
expel the Palestinian Liberation Organisation were a milestone of Hezbollah’s 
establishment (Qassem, 2005). In this year, Islamic Amal Movement emerged 
from Amal Movement when Amal’s Leader Nabih Berri joined “The National 
Salvation Committee” which established by the then Lebanese President Elias 
Sarkis in 1982 to replace the Palestinian Liberation Organisation in western 
Beirut (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). As the result of these events, primarily the 
Israeli invasion, nine persons (The Committee of the Nine) representing different 
Islamic committees: three members from the Islamic Scholars of Bekaa district, 
three members from the Islamic Amal Movement and three members of Da’wa 
Party have met and agreed on a final document sent to the founder of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, the late Imam Khomeini, for blessing and approval (Kasser, 
2011). The emerged document, which represents Hezbollah’s identity, included 
the united vision of the Islamic committee about Islam, Islamic ruling and faith 
in resistance against the Israeli occupation (Qassem, 2005). In this regard, 
the members of the Islamic Scholars of Bekaa district belong to the Lebanese 
Islamic scholars who fled from Iraq after Baath coup (Alagha, 2006). One of 
these scholars was Sayyed Abbas Al-Musawi who chose the name of Hezbollah 
and became later the second Secretary-General of Hezbollah (Alagha, 2006). 
The chosen name was an outcome of a debate about the suitable name “Ummat 
Hezbollah” (The Nation of Hezbollah) or Hezbollah (Kasser, 2011). The name 
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of the Hezbollah is combination of two Arabic words “Hezb” which means 
“Party” and “Allah” which means “God.” Therefore, Hezbollah means “The 
party of Allah” or “The Party of God.” Notably, the name Hezbollah derived 
from the verse 56 of Surah Al-Maidah in the holy Quran, “Whoever takes Allah, 
His Apostle and those who believe as friends [must know] that Allah’s party 
[Hezbollah] is indeed the triumphant” (Alagha, 2006; Qassem, 2005).
However, Hezbollah, which held initially the motto “The Islamic Revolution 
in Lebanon”, appeared officially on February 22, 1985, when it published 
its manifesto or what so called “The Open Letter to the Oppressed” which 
included Hezbollah’s identity, objectives and the establishment of “The Islamic 
Resistance” (Alagha, 2006). 
In contrast to other researchers, Alagha (2006) argues that Hezbollah was 
established in 1978 not in 1982 as a result of “The Islamic Milieu” in Lebanon. 
Nevertheless, the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 are the two critical political and military 
junctures led to the emergence of Hezbollah (Jaber, 1997; Norton, 2009; Saad-
Ghorayeb, 2002). In this regard, Norton (2009) did not ignore that the Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and occupying some territories was a direct cause 
in Hezbollah’s establishment, quoting this argument from two former Israeli 
Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Ehud Barak. However, he considers that this 
invasion only accelerated the emergence of Hezbollah. Based on his reading to 
the Shiite’s social, political and economic history in Lebanon since 1960s, Norton 
(2009) concludes that the revolutionary ideas of young Shiites in Lebanon, who 
inspired by the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, will lead to the 
establishment of Hezbollah. Figure 1 shows the factors led to the establishment 
of Hezbollah.
Figure 1- This model shows how Hezbollah emerged
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The next section aims to show the structure of Hezbollah to determine the 
position of its military wing, because this is crucial for the later sections to 
identify the media discourse of “The Islamic Resistance.”
STRUCTURE OF HEZBOLLAH
Before it appeared into scene in Lebanon and the Middle East, Hezbollah 
launched through its combat organ several military operations and suicide 
attacks against Israel between 1982 and 1985 (Alagha, 2006). However, at that 
time Hezbollah did not state clearly its involvement in these operations, because 
the body of the organisation was still under construction. When Hezbollah 
emerged officially in 1985, it named itself - as appeared in its flag and statements 
– “Hezbollah - the Islamic Revolution in Lebanon.” The main body of Hezbollah 
is the Shura Council (The Consultative Council) which “passed through different 
stages from nine members to five and was finalized to seven as of 1984” (Alagha, 
2006, p. 35). Gradually, the structure of Hezbollah started to crystalize through 
establishing several councils. 
As shown in Figure 2, which illustrates the structure of Hezbollah and is taken 
from Hamzeh (2004, p. 46), the leadership apparatus or the Shura Council is the 
basic body in Hezbollah. However, the Executive Council directs all Hezbollah’s 
civilian units and Hezbollah’s members in the districts of Bekaa (or Beq’a), 
South Lebanon and Beirut. These districts are called regions. The smaller cell of 
Hezbollah’s hierarchy is a group directed by a branch. “Each region is divided 
into twenty to twenty-five sectors, each of which includes tens of branches. 
Members are organised into hundreds of groups that constitute the main entry to 
the party” (Hamzeh, 2004, p. 75).
Figure 2- Hezbollah’s organisational structure (Hamzeh, 2004, p. 46)
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The councils of Hezbollah, as shown in Figure 2, can be described briefly as 
following:
• The Central Council which elects the members of the Shura Council 
(Hamzeh, 2004). It is “an assembly of almost 200 party founder and 
cadres” (Hamzeh, 2004, p. 45).
•	 The Shura Council (the Consultative Council), known as well the 
leadership apparatus, and it is the highest body of Hezbollah (Hamzeh, 
2004). In this council the majority of its elected members since May 
1991 are clergy (Alagha, 2006). According to Hamzeh (1993) this 
council “is charged with legislative, executive, judicial, political 
and military affairs and with the overall administration of the party. 
Decisions made by the Council are reached either unanimously or by 
majority vote” (p. 325).
• The Jihadi (or Jihad) Council. It was established in 1995 and headed in 
2004 by the Secretary-General of Hezbollah (Alagha, 2006). Its mission 
is to identify the enemy and the ways to face it (Hamzeh, 2004).
• The Executive Council. This council replaced in 1995 of what so called 
“the Executive Shura” (Alagha, 2006).
• The Religious-Judicial Council. This council is “responsible for the 
dossier of the shar’i matters and Islamic scholars’ affairs” (Alagha, 2006, 
p. 57).
• The Political Council (or Politburo). It has been established as a result of 
Hezbollah’s engagement in the Lebanese political life and parliamentary 
election since 1992 (Alagha, 2006).
These councils headed by a Secretary-General, who is assisted by a deputy, a 
political assistant and a media advisor (Alagha, 2006). The Secretary-General 
of Hezbollah is the leader of “The Islamic Resistance” (Hamzeh, 2004). The 
current Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah (or Nasrallah) 
is the third in the row Secretary-General. He holds this position since February 
1992, after the assassination by the Israelis of Sayyed Abbas Al-Mussawy, then 
Secretary-General of Hezbollah (Alagha, 2006).
This section has shown the general organisational structure 
of Hezbollah. However, the next section, which is based on this 
structure, will discuss the position of “The Islamic Resistance” 
in Hezbollah’s structure to determine in a later section its media 
discourse. 
“THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE”
Hezbollah’s first political document in 1985, “The open letter to the Oppressed”, 
stated that there is no military organ separates from the rest of its bodies, and 
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thus every member may turn into a fighter when the concerned leader recall 
for Jihad (Kasser, 2011). Furthermore, the letter points out that the resistance 
against Israel emerged by people in the occupied territories (Kasser, 2011). In 
this regard, many researchers point out that Hezbollah faced Israel through its 
military arm “The Islamic Resistance” after the Israeli invasion to Lebanon in 
1982 (Alagha, 2006; Hamzeh, 2004; Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). 
The missed point in the researches is that the lack of evidence about the 
emergence of “The Islamic Resistance.” In contrast to other researches, 
this thesis argues that “The Islamic Resistance” emerged before Hezbollah. 
According to its website (www.moqawama.org), there is an indication that “The 
Islamic Resistance” existed before 1982. In an obituary of one of its fighters 
called Nazeh Fadl Harb, “The Islamic Resistance” uncovered in a statement that 
its “martyr” was from the first combatants who joined “The Islamic Resistance” 
in 1979 before he was killed in 1981 during a jihadist duty (“The Martyr Nazeh 
Fadl Harb”, 2013). This statement provides overt evidence that “The Islamic 
Resistance” existed before 1982. The year 1978 concurs with the first Israeli 
invasion (in June) to Lebanon and the disappearance of Imam Musa Assadr (in 
August) and the year 1979 (in February) concurs with the success of the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran (Alagha, 2006). As result, these events show that the end 
of 1978 and the beginning of 1979 may indicate that “The Islamic Resistance” 
emerged in that period of time. Thus, Alagha (2006) mixed-up between “The 
Islamic Resistance” and Hezbollah, arguing that the latter existed in 1978, as 
shown previously, without providing apart from analysis a clear evidence or 
reference to support his claims.
The development of Hezbollah’s military wing can be attributed to the role 
of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (Pasdaran) who crossed the Syrian border 
towards Lebanon, in order to train “The Islamic Resistance’s” fighters in 
Bekaa valley (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). Thus, the Iranian support and the Syrian 
facilities, where the Syrian army was in Lebanon, played a crucial role in 
creating Hezbollah’s military wing (Addis & Blanchard, 2011; Alagha, 2006). 
In this regard, Saad-Ghorayeb (2002) argues that without the Iranian extreme 
support on all sectors “The Islamic Resistance” needs “an additional 50 years 
for the movement to score the same achievements in the absence of Iranian 
backing” (p. 14). As the result of this support, it can be concluded that Hezbollah 
is the protégé of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Remarkably, it might be worth 
to indicate in this vein the noticeable similarity of Hezbollah and the Iranian 
Revolutionary guards’ flags (Erlich & Kahati, 2007).
Unlike many researchers who focused on Hezbollah’s history, policy and 
ideology, Hamzeh (1993; 2004) has paid more attention to the organisational 
structure of this party. In his both charts about Hezbollah’s organisational 
structure, as shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3, Hamzeh (1993; 2004) argues that 
“The Islamic Resistance” is linked directly to Shura Council or the leadership 
apparatus, which is headed by the Secretary-General of Hezbollah.
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Figure 3- Hezbollah’s old organisational structure (Hamzeh, 1993, p.326)
In his latest organisational structure of Hezbollah, as shown in Figure 2, 
Hamzeh (2004) points out that “The Islamic Resistance consists at least of two 
main sections: the enforcement and recruitment section and the combat section” 
(p.70). To understand the role of the enforcement and recruitment section 
it is crucial to shed light on membership procedures in Hezbollah, according 
to Hamzeh (2004). Generally, the individual who wants to be a member in 
Hezbollah should join a group (Majmu’ah) in a region for two years and should 
be primarily approved by the party’s security section. The enforcement and 
recruitment section in every region ensures that the new individual passes two 
periods of education and training. In the first period and first year, which called 
enforcement (Ta’abia), the individual receives religious and cultural studies 
about Hezbollah and its ideology. Passing this stage successfully is crucial for the 
individual to engage in the second year period which called ordered discipline 
(Intizam) and includes physical training. The end of this year determines “the 
role and the position of the new member within the majmu’ah [group] at the 
branch level. Those who excel in military abilities will be fighters. Others will 
serve in the political and social units of the party” (Hamzeh, 2004, p.76). 
However, the combat section is divided into four units: Istishhadiyyon 
(Self-Martyrs) which means those fighters who are willing to do “Martyrdom 
Operations”, Special Forces, Rocket Launchers and Regular Fighters (Hamzeh, 
2004). In this regard, “The Military Operational Headquarters”, which 
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supervised by Shura Council and headed by the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, 
organises the military operations of “The Islamic Resistance” to ensure the 
secrecy of its activities (Hamzeh, 2004). 
According to Hamzeh (2004) “The Islamic Resistance” consists of groups 
and “each group is self-contained and semiautonomous. Thus, if one is plucked 
from the main branch, the others cannot be discovered easily. In structural 
terms, groups communicate through military sector commanders who in turn 
communicate through a military regional commander who is usually a member 
of Hizbullah’s military operational headquarters” (p.71). 
Once every member of a group (majmu’ah) recalled by “The Military 
Operational Headquarters”, a military sector commander provides the collected 
group instructions about the required operation (Hamzeh, 2004).
However, the security organ is linked directly to the Shura Council and 
consists of two bodies. Firstly, the Party Security. Its main mission is to protect 
Hezbollah’s organisation and its members from penetration. Thus, its approval 
is crucial in recruiting Hezbollah’s members and prospected fighters. Secondly, 
the External Security or Encounter Security. It aims to protect Hezbollah and 
“The Islamic Resistance” from spies and external intelligence attacks (Hamzeh, 
2004). Based on these illustrations, Figure 4 shows the organisational structure 
of Hezbollah’s military and security apparatus.
Figure 4- The organisational structure of Hezbollah’s military and security 
apparatus based on Hamzeh’s literature (Hamzeh, 2004)
In his earliest study about Hezbollah’s structure between 1988 and 1992, 
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as shown in Figure 3, Hamzeh (1993) argues that the military apparatus of 
Hezbollah includes two bodies: “The Islamic Resistance” and “Al-Jihad Al-
Islami.” However, the later body does not exist in Hamzeh’s second chart about 
organisational structure as shown in Figure 2.
Hamzeh (1993) points outs that “Al-Jihad Al-Islami” named also “Islamic 
Jihad Organisation” “was in charge of suicidal attacks against Western and 
Israeli targets” (p. 328). It committed in 1983 two suicidal attacks against the 
Multi-National forces in Beirut “which resulted in the death of 241 American and 
58 French soldiers respectively” (Alagha, 2006, p. 281). Repeatedly, Hezbollah 
denies the existence of this military organ in its organisational body without 
condemning its attacks in 1983 (Hamzeh, 2004). This body, which has several 
names such as “Hezbollah’s External Security Organisation” and “Foreign 
Action Unit”, considered terrorist by the Australian Government (Australian 
National Security, 2012). 
However, what’s common between Hamzeh’s two charts about Hezbollah’s 
organisational structure (Figure 2 and Figure 3) is the direct linkage between 
“The Islamic Resistance” and the Shura Council or the leadership apparatus, 
which is headed by the Secretary-General of Hezbollah. Furthermore, the two 
Figures 4 and 5 show that the military wing of Hezbollah is separated from other 
Hezbollah’s organs and bodies. 
In contrast to Rabil (2008) who linked the military apparatus to the Jihadi 
Council and separated it from other Hezbollah’s bodies as it is linked only 
to the Shura Council, Hamzeh (2004) asserts on the notion that “The Islamic 
Resistance” is linked directly to the Shura Council. Although Rabil’s argument 
hinges at the point that the military apparatus is under the direct control of the 
Shura Council through the Jihadi Council, Hamzeh (2004) provides proofs that 
the Jihadi Council has no direct control over Hezbollah’s military apparatus and 
its recommendations raised only to the Shura Council.
Towards this end, Hamzeh (2004) argues that the position of “The Islamic 
Resistance” in the party provides Hezbollah pliability to face the political and 
military challenges. As result of this position, some countries consider only 
the military wing of Hezbollah as a terrorist organisation (Australian National 
Security, 2012). Table 1 lists the countries other than Israel which consider 
Hezbollah and/or its military wing a terrorist organisation. Notably, Israel 
considers whole Hezbollah as a terrorist organisation, because it represents a 
perpetuate threat to its security (Baranovich & Moorthy, 2011). Remarkably, 
as Harik (2004) argues, Hezbollah endeavours to undermine globally the label 
terrorism against its organisation through two strategies. Firstly, Hezbollah’s 
military wing “The Islamic Resistance” aims to be as other liberation movements 
in the world targeting only the Israeli occupation. Secondly, Hezbollah engages 
in the Lebanese political life as a party and has its own representatives in the 
parliament. 
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Table 1: Countries which Consider Hezbollah and/or its Military Wing a 
Terrorist Organisation
Country Organisation Comment
Australia
Hezbollah’s External 
Security Organisation 
(ESO)
Known as well by Al-Jihad Al-
Islami; Islamic Jihad Organisation; 
Revolutionary Justice 
Organisation…
Bahrain Whole Hezbollah Since April 2013
Canada Whole Hezbollah
European Union Hezbollah’s Military Wing Since July 2013
New Zealand Hezbollah’s Military Wing
Netherland Whole Hezbollah
It is the only European country 
classified Hezbollah as a terrorist 
organisation
United Kingdom Hezbollah’s Military Wing
It took this standpoint before EU’s 
decision.
United States of America Whole Hezbollah
Source: Australian National Security, 2012; Bahrain First Arab Country to 
Blacklist Hezbollah as Terrorist Organisation, 2013; Pawlak & Croft, 2013.
Due to its religious and ideological framework, Hezbollah established 
“The Lebanese Multi-Confessional Brigades” (LMCB) on November 3, 1997 
as a military wing separated from its organisational body and “The Islamic 
Resistance” to allow Lebanese seculars and nationalists to join the military 
efforts to liberate the occupied Lebanese land form Israel (Alagha, 2006). In 
this vein, Hezbollah’s engagement in the Lebanese political life and its assertion 
in its discourse on the resistance to face the Israeli occupation led this party in 
1998 to change its motto from “Hezbollah-the Islamic Revolution in Lebanon”, 
which fears the Lebanese Christians, into “Hezbollah-the Islamic Resistance in 
Lebanon” (Alagha, 2006). This policy aimed also to emphasize on the culture of 
resistance in Lebanon to create a virtual society called the “Resisting Society” 
(Minzili, 2011; Qassem, 2008). However, Hezbollah refused to dissolve its 
military wing “The Islamic Resistance” after the Israeli withdrawal from south 
Lebanon in May 2000 (Alagha, 2006). Instead, the party asserts in its discourse 
that “The Islamic Resistance” will continue in order to liberate Shebaa Farms, 
which are close to Golan Heights, from Israeli occupation and to protect the 
Lebanese territories from Israeli aggressions (Baylouny, 2006; Qassem, 2008).
In a nutshell, the military wing of Hezbollah – “The Islamic Resistance” 
is separated from other Hezbollah’s bodies and it is linked directly to Shura 
Council or what so called the leadership apparatus. Consequently, the leader 
of “The Islamic Resistance” is the Secretary-General of Hezbollah. However, 
Hamzeh, particularly in his latest study about Hezbollah’s structure, did not 
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provide information about other sections constitute “The Islamic Resistance.” 
The next section will discuss Hezbollah’s media outlets, because this is crucial 
to distinguish between these outlets and “The Islamic Resistance’s” media and 
hence to identify the media discourse of “The Islamic Resistance.”
HEZBOLLAH’S MEDIA OUTLETS
In its early stages of emergence, Hezbollah acknowledged the importance of 
media to transmit its messages and to support the mission of its military arm (El 
Houri, 2012; Hollander, 2006). To win the media war, Hezbollah is working on 
shaping the local and international perceptions about the conflict with Israel, and 
gaining various types of support to complete its activities (Lyons, 2008). 
In this regard, the party uses various types of media outlets and utilises the 
communication developments (Lyme, 2009). In both Hezbollah’s structures 
provided by Hamzeh (1993; 2004), there is a section or a unit, such as Information 
Unit in Figure 2 and Mass Media section in Figure 3, to supervise its own media 
outlets and to communicate with external media outlets and journalists (Lyme, 
2009; Osipova, 2011). Yet, all Hezbollah’s media outlets are under the Secretary-
General control since July 30, 2001 (Alagha, 2001).
Since its inception, Hezbollah established several media outlets. Based on 
reading the literature about Hezbollah’s media in Conway (2003; 2007), Erlich 
& Kahati (2007), Hamzeh (2004), Lamloum (2009) and Lyme (2009), it can 
be concluded that Hezbollah’s media is divided into three genres. Firstly, the 
internal media such as bulletins directed to Hezbollah’s members and contain 
analysis about recent events (Erlich & Kahati, 2007). Secondly, the advertising 
and cultural media such as posters, exhibitions, tapes, CDs, video games and 
books which are generally Islamic (Abo Rida, 2012; Lyme, 2009). Thirdly, 
the traditional and online media outlets (Conway, 2003; 2007; Hamzeh, 2004; 
Lamloum, 2009; Lyme, 2009). 
Abo Rida (2012) argues that Hezbollah’s internal bulletins aim to educate and 
cultivate the members of the party and they are divided into four categories: 
The Political Circular: This bulletin issued by the consultative council and 
directed the party’s cadres in order to know the contemporary local, regional and 
global political issues and the Hezbollah’s standpoint of these issues.
The Cultural Circular: This bulletin issued periodically by Hezbollah’s 
concerned cultural department to provide the members with general Islamic 
concepts, such as Hadith and sermon.
The Supreme Leader Speech: The concerned department in the party issued 
a periodic pamphlet called Miskat Al-Nour (The Lantern of Light) includes the 
recent speech of Iranian Supreme Leader Sayyed Ali Khamenei who considered 
Hezbollah’s supreme jurist (Al-wali Al-Faqih). 
The Hebrew Bulletin: Under the motto “Know Your enemy”, Hezbollah issues 
periodically an internal bulletin contains translated Israeli news from Hebrew to 
Arabic. This bulletin includes up-to-date news about Israel social and political 
Jurnal Komunikasi
Malaysian Journal of Communication
Jilid 30(2) 2014: 117-140
130
status quo. 
Regarding the third genre, Hezbollah’s first media outlet was a radio called 
“Sawt	Almustadafin	-	Sawt	Alislam” (The Voice of the Oppressed - The Voice of 
Islam) which started transmitting from Baalbeck city, in northern Bekaa valley, 
soon after the Israeli invasion to Lebanon in June1982 (Darwish, 2002; Lamloum, 
2009). This radio, which usually headed by an Iranian, was targeting Lebanon, 
Jordan and the Occupied Territories. Due to its supporting the Palestinian Intifada 
and “The Islamic Resistance’s” military operations, it was known “The Radio of 
the Resistance.” Thus, the Israeli air force raided nine times on its transmitter. 
However, Hezbollah muzzled this radio in 2002, because it was unlicensed from 
the Lebanese communication authorities (Darwish, 2002). 
However, the second Hezbollah’s media outlet was Al-Ahed (The Pledge) 
appeared into scene by mid June 1984 (Conway, 2007). This weekly newspaper 
followed by five periodicals and three radios including Al-Nour (The Light) 
which started transmitting on 9 May 1988 (Hamzeh, 2004; Lamloum, 2009). 
This radio followed by Al-Manar (The Beacon or The Lighthouse) television 
on June 3, 1991 (Alagha, 2006). Both Al-Nour and Al-Manar, which they 
considered Hezbollah’s mouthpiece, constitutes a company called the Lebanese 
Communication Group (Conway, 2007; Lamloum, 2009).
In terms of online media, Hezbollah acknowledged early the importance of 
cyberspace launching its official website www.Hizbollah.org in 1996 (Knight 
& Ubayasiri, 2002; Conway, 2003). This website followed by many affiliated 
websites, because the media outlets Al-Ahed, Al-Nour, Al-Manar and some 
Hezbollah’s units launched their own web pages (Conway, 2003; 2007, Lamloum, 
2009; Lyme, 2009). 
In his studying Hezbollah’s websites and its affiliates, Weimann (2008) 
points out that there are between 40 to 50 websites, grouping them into several 
categories include: News and Information, Welfare and Social Services, 
Religious Indoctrination, Personal Websites of Hezbollah’s key figures, Anti-
Israel Websites, Wartime Propaganda Online and Youth-Oriented Features. 
Regarding the last category, Weimann (2008) sheds light on the electronic game 
Special Force, which launched by Hezbollah in 2003, to allow the zealots to join 
virtually the resistance.
Due to the importance of cyberspace, Hezbollah established Electronic Media 
Unit (“A Meeting between The Electronic Media Unit and Media Activists on 
social Network”, 2013). This unit is missed in Hamzeh’s study about Hezbollah’s 
organisational structure (as shown in Figure 2). 
This section has shown basically Hezbollah’s media history and its outlets. 
It revealed that the party started establishing media outlets before its official 
announcement in 1985. Furthermore, Hezbollah utilised early the cyberspace to 
transmit its messages.
The next section is about Al-Manar television. It aims to provide a preface 
about this television in order to state the difference between Al-Manar and “The 
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Military Media Unit” and to ensue in identifying the media discourse of “The 
Islamic Resistance” and its elements.
AL-MANAR TELEVISION
As noted in the last section, Al-Manar is considered Hezbollah’s mouthpiece. 
In a press interview with the then Al-Manar Chairman Abdullah Kasser, he 
refused to call Al-Manar Hezbollah’s channel, pointing out that the reason of 
this description because the channel headed by a Hezbollah’s member and 
supports the line of resistance against Israel. He revealed that Al-Manar funded 
by 20 investors where 55% of them belong to Hezbollah and the other 45% are 
merchants and independent businessmen (Jaballah, 2006).
Before the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon in May 2000, Al-Manar was 
broadcasting extensively and exclusively the statements and activities of “The 
Islamic Resistance”, particularly its military operations’ videos after obtaining 
them from “The Military Media Unit” of “The Islamic Resistance”- the military 
wing of Hezbollah (Harb, 2011). In this context, Al-Manar described itself as 
“The Channel of Resistance” and after the Israeli withdrawal on May 25, 2000 as 
“The Channel of Arabs and Muslims.” Since then Al-Manar started broadcasting 
through satellites to other countries in the Middle East and later to other parts of 
the world after obtaining a license from Lebanese Government on April 5, 2000 
(Conway, 2007; Harb, 2011; Osipova, 2011).
After the outbreak of the second Palestinian Intifada in September 2000, Al-
Manar established what so called a “War Room” to support the Intifada and 
encourage the culture of resistance against Israel (Wahdan, 2009). Thus, Al-
Manar called then “Indifada Television” (Abo Al-Nasr, 2003).  
In this vein, Maznar (2001) outlines Al-Manar’s strategy as followings:
•	 Seeking	to	be	the	first	channel	in	Lebanon	and	the	world	concerned	in	
the	conflict	with	Israel	by	supporting	“The	Islamic	Resistance”	and	
Palestinian Intifada. 
•	 Seeking	to	be	the	first	channel	in	Lebanon	and	the	Arab	World	
concerned with airing political and Jihadist programs.
•	 Seeking	to	be	a	basic	channel	in	Lebanon	and	the	Arab	World	concerned	
with	scientific,	social	and	educational	issues	after	May	2000.
•	 Seeking to train the channel’s cadre to entice a big audience. 
During the first days of “July War” between Israel and Hezbollah, the Israeli 
air force bombed Al-Manar channel headquarters in southern district of Beirut. 
However, Al- Manar, which had put earlier an emergency plan, resumed its 
broadcasting after two minutes of muzzling (Lamloum, 2009). The channel after 
this war portrayed Hezbollah’s military arm “The Islamic Resistance” in the 
frontline to defend Arabs and Muslims (Ajemian, 2008). Thus, undoubtedly Al-
Manar considered as the mouthpiece of Hezbollah and “The Islamic resistance.” 
As Kalb and Saivetz (2007) argue “Al-Manar was to Hezbollah what Pravda 
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[newspaper] was to the Soviet Union” (p. 20). In this regard, Hezbollah uses 
“Al-Manar to strengthen its discourse and its political religious project within 
the Middle East” (Fontana, 2010, p. 8).
Al-Manar broadcasts several programs including political talk shows, 
entertainment, sport, news, religious and cultural programs, music videos or 
songs, series and programs for youth and children (Jorisch, 2004). According to 
an investigative report about Al-Manar issued by the Australian Communication 
and Media Authority (2010), the themes of Al-Manar programs are Anti 
American and Anti-Israeli; Resistance Narratives of Hezbollah; Glorification 
of Hezbollah’s Martyrs; and Anti-Semitism. However, Baylouny (2006) in 
her comparison between Al-Manar and Alhurra, the U.S. satellite to compete 
anti-American outlets in the Arab world, argues that Al-Manar’s messages are 
focused on “Palestine, the continuing threat posed by Israel, American bias in 
the Arab- Israeli conflict, the power and importance of community solidarity, 
and pride in Arab culture and the achievements of the Islamic Resistance” (p. 2).
Al-Manar’s propaganda in supporting the military actions against Israeli army 
and its standpoint for Washington’s role in the Middle East pushed the United 
States to ban the channel and classify it a terrorist organisation on December 
17, 2004. This coincides with the banning of the channel in France under 
anti-Semitism charges four days earlier (Alagha, 2006). In the same manner, 
Netherland and Spain banned this channel respectively in the mid of 2005 and 
the Asiasat satellite blocked Al-Manar’s transmitting to Asia (Lamloum, 2009).
In short, Al-Manar is a licensed media institution in Lebanon. It is considered 
the mouthpiece of Hezbollah and its military arm, because it airs exclusively the 
materials produced by “The Military Media Unit” of “The Islamic Resistance.” 
It airs programs support the resistance against Israel. However, the next section 
will shed light on “The Military Media Unit” before identifying and outlining the 
elements of the media discourse of “The Islamic Resistance.”
“THE MILITARY MEDIA UNIT”
“The Islamic Resistance” has benefitted from media lessons of other liberation 
movements, especially the Palestinian Liberation Organisation and as result it 
started using the camera as a parallel weapon to its military operations against 
Israeli army (Khatib, 2012).  For “The Islamic Resistance”, the Arab defeat in 
1967 in the war against Israel, Grenada and Vietnam Wars were a precious lesson 
on how to use media effectively in the conflict with Israel, because it is crucial 
to provide the journalists an “alternative access to information” (Harb, 2011, p. 
179). 
In this regard, “The Islamic Resistance” created a secret unit “The Military 
Media Unit” (named also War	 Information	 Unit) which holds military 
characteristics, because its members undergo military, ideological and artistic 
trainings to film the military operations and air them professionally (Atrisi, 
2000). The cameramen of this unit hold also guns in the battlefield for the 
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purpose of self-defence merely (Harb, 2011). Remarkably, Al-Ahed newspaper 
unveiled the existence of this unit in 1984 to record fighters’ testaments and its 
first military operation film against an Israeli barrack dated on November 22, 
1986 (Lamloum, 2009). 
Although Hamzeh (2004) provides a nuanced understanding of “The Islamic 
Resistance’s” organisational structure, he missed to sketch “The Military Media 
Unit” in its body. Figure 5 shows the position of “The Military Media Unit” as 
linked to Hezbollah’s military apparatus structure, or by other words to “The 
Islamic Resistance.”
Figure 5- “The Military Media Unit’s” position in Hezbollah’s military apparatus
Harb (2011) points out that “The Military Media Unit” is monitoring alongside 
with Al-Manar the Israeli media outlets for propaganda reason. In 2004 there 
were eight translators working in both Al-Manar and “The Military Media 
Unit.” Their mission was to monitor the Israeli media and translate from 
Hebrew into Arabic all the broadcasted issues related to Hezbollah and “The 
Islamic Resistance.” Harb, who interviewed the head of “The Military Media 
Unit”, named himself as Haj Maitham, reveals some information about the unit’s 
mechanism of work and how it developed in filming. Hence, the unit provides, 
primarily, Al-Manar videotapes and statements about the military operations of 
“The Islamic Resistance.” 
However, “The Military Media Unit” provided military operations’ videos 
to outlets and companies other than Al-Manar in four occasions. Firstly, it 
provided Assafir newspaper in October 2000 with photos about the operation 
of capturing three Israeli soldiers. Thus, the newspaper published exceptionally 
an issue on Sunday (Hezbollah Joins the War in Palestine, 2000). Secondly, it 
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sold the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC) a military operation video 
for a documentary purpose in 2006. This video contains footages of capturing 
three Israeli soldiers by “The Islamic Resistance” in October 2000 (Eljek, 2006). 
Thirdly, it provided Al-Mayadeen satellite chairman Ghassan ben Jiddo the 
military operation video of capturing two Israeli soldiers in 2006 to air it through 
its channel in July 2012 (Fahs, 2012). Fourthly, it provided videos to a company 
produced the drama “The Victorious” about “The Islamic Resistance” (Meree, 
2011).
Towards this end, this section spotted “The Military Media Unit” in Hezbollah’s 
military apparatus. It showed its history and its cooperation with Al-Manar. 
However, the next section will outline the outputs of this unit, because they 
constitute a major element of media discourse of “The Islamic Resistance.”
MEDIA DISCOURSE OF “THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE”
The aim of this research is to identify and interpret the media discourse of “The 
Islamic Resistance” in order to identify its signs and codes and consequently to 
explore its frames and objectives. Thus, it is crucial to identify the elements of 
this discourse. 
As discussed previously the military wing of Hezbollah is linked directly to 
the highest body in the party the Shura Council, headed by the Secretary-General 
and separated from other Hezbollah’s bodies to ensure the secrecy of military 
operations. Furthermore, “The Military Media Unit” is linked directly to “The 
Islamic Resistance.” These features depict the basis of media discourse of “The 
Islamic Resistance.” Yet, this discourse, as shown in Figure 6, is constituted by 
military speeches of the leader of “The Islamic Resistance”, who is Hezbollah’s 
Secretary-General, and the outputs of “The Military Media Unit.”
Figure 6- The elements of media discourse of “The Islamic Resistance” 
However, the identification of “The Military Media Unit” outputs can be 
traced in several studies (e.g. Harb, 2011; Osipova, 2011) and the website 
(www.moqawama.org). Remarkably, the literature reveals that there is no study 
outlines all the outputs of this unit. In this vein, Harb (2011) identified only 
one element the military operations’ videos. Osipova (2011) added two elements 
documenting the military activities (written statements) and filming fighters’ 
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testaments. In addition to these elements, there are video songs and propaganda 
flashes. The latest outputs can be noticed through observing the video songs and 
flashes screened on Al-Manar as there are captions on some of them indicate their 
producer “The Military Media Unit” (e.g. Al-Manar, 2010). Thus, the outputs, as 
shown in Figure 7, are: Statements, Fighters’ Testaments, Military Operations’ 
Videos and Video songs including propaganda flashes.
Figure 7- The outputs of “The Military Media Unit” which constitute a major part 
of “The Islamic Resistance’s” media discourse
This section outlines and identifies the elements of media discourse of “The 
Islamic Resistance.” 
CONCLUSION
This paper traced the history of the Lebanese party Hezbollah, its organisational 
structure, its military arm, its media outlets and “The Military Media Unit.” It 
aimed to sketch only on media discourse of “The Islamic Resistance” to identify 
its elements. In summary, the paper revealed:
•	 The	socio-political	context	of	Hezbollah’s	establishment,	and	
consequently the context of its military wing “The Islamic Resistance” 
and its discourse.
•	 The organisational structure of Hezbollah’s military apparatus and the 
position of “The Islamic Resistance.”
•	 “The Islamic Resistance” emerged before Hezbollah and by the end 
1978 and the beginning of 1979.
•	 “The Islamic Resistance” is linked only to the leadership apparatus of 
Hezbollah.
•	 The leader of “The Islamic Resistance” is Hezbollah’s Secretary-
General.
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•	 “The Military Media Unit” uses Al-Manar’s satellite television to 
transmit its messages and air its videos.
•	 The media discourse of “The Islamic Resistance” constituted by the 
outputs of “The Military Media Unit” and speeches of its leader the 
Secretary-General of Hezbollah.
•	 The	outputs	of	“The	Military	Media	Unit”	are	written	statements,	
fighters’	testaments,	military	operations’	videos,	and	video	songs	and	
propaganda	flashes.
In a nutshell, this paper, as intended, bridged a gap through identifying the 
media discourse of “The Islamic Resistance.” 
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